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Abstract
Social skills probably emerge from the interaction between different neural processing levels. However, social neuroscience
is fragmented into highly specialized, rarely cross-referenced topics. The present study attempts a systematic reconciliation
by deriving a social brain definition from neural activity meta-analyses on social-cognitive capacities. The social brain was
characterized by meta-analytic connectivity modeling evaluating coactivation in task-focused brain states and physiological
fluctuations evaluating correlations in task-free brain states. Network clustering proposed a functional segregation into
(1) lower sensory, (2) limbic, (3) intermediate, and (4) high associative neural circuits that together mediate various social
phenomena. Functional profiling suggested that no brain region or network is exclusively devoted to social processes.
Finally, nodes of the putative mirror-neuron system were coherently cross-connected during tasks and more tightly coupled
to embodied simulation systems rather than abstract emulation systems. These first steps may help reintegrate the
specialized research agendas in the social and affective sciences.
Key words: BrainMap database, meta-analytic connectivity modeling, resting-state correlations, social cognition, statistical
learning, systems neuroscience
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Introduction
The complexity of the relationships between individuals is a
defining feature of the human species. Besides early descrip-
tions of a systems-level neuroscientific framework with impli-
cations for social mechanisms (Nauta 1971; Damasio et al.
1991), the “social brain hypothesis” proposed that selection
pressures from social interaction, rather than from interaction
with the physical environment, led to the continuous refine-
ment of human behavior (Humphrey 1978; Byrne and Whiten
1988). Social capacities have likely enabled and catalyzed
human cultural evolution, including achievements such as
sciences, arts, philosophy, and technology, that surpassed the
speed and breadth of biological evolution (Tomasello 1999;
Vogeley and Roepstorff 2009). These capacities potentially
account for the disproportionate volume and complexity of the
primate brain. Recent research demonstrated that brain vol-
ume in monkeys and humans correlates with different mea-
sures of social complexity, including group size, cooperative
behavior, coalition formation, and tactical deception (Dunbar
and Shultz 2007; Lebreton et al. 2009; Powell et al. 2010; Lewis
et al. 2011; Sallet et al. 2011). An implication of this social brain
hypothesis is that it places at a premium on the capacity to
solve social problems. Consistent with this view, social skills
are an important contribution to well-being. On the one hand,
psychiatric disorders often entail deficits in social interaction.
On the other hand, exposure to dysfunctional social environ-
ments considerably increases the risk of psychiatric disease
onset (Cacioppo and Hawkley 2009; Tost and Meyer-Lindenberg
2012). Ultimately, psychiatric illness has a hidden cost, impact-
ing not only on the life of patients, but also affecting their
friends, families, and whole communities.
Although the social brain hypothesis embeds social interac-
tion in a neurocognitive context, its underlying brain mecha-
nisms have only received little attention before the 1990s
(Cacioppo 2002; Mitchell 2009; Frith and Frith 2010; Schilbach
et al. 2013). In the last 2 decades, the discipline of “social neuro-
science” has expanded rapidly, with the development of many
different specialized topics which focus on stimulus properties
important for social cognition, such as face processing or
motor-behavior comprehension, as well as more complex
higher-order cognition, such as moral reasoning or mental-
state attribution. These sensory-driven and higher-level social-
affective processes governing everyday life naturally melt into
and transition between each other.
In general terms, we argue that the absence of an overarch-
ing framework within which to embed social cognition may
lead to different research groups suggesting diverging interpre-
tational streams for similar brain correlates (Spreng et al. 2009;
Schilbach et al. 2012; Barrett and Satpute 2013). First, the brain
correlates underlying autobiographical memory retrieval, self-
projection into the future, theorizing about others’ mental con-
tent, and spatial navigation have been statistically shown to
feature significant topographical overlap (Spreng et al. 2009).
Second, neuroimaging studies on empathy have meta-
analytically revealed robust recruitment of the “saliency net-
work” (Fan et al. 2011), while the “default-mode network” can
also be engaged depending on the type of stimulus material
(Lamm et al. 2011). Third, the neural correlates underlying
trustworthiness and attractiveness judgments on faces have
long been studied in isolation, but turned out to recruit widely
overlapping neural circuits as measured by functional neuroim-
aging (Bzdok et al. 2011, 2012a; Mende-Siedlecki et al. 2013). On
the same token, one group of social neuroscientists advocate
the primacy of abstract modeling of thoughts in social cogni-
tion (e.g., Saxe 2005), while other social neuroscientists instead
embrace primacy of embodied simulation of others’ actions
(e.g., Iacoboni 2009). Yet, it is still debated whether humans
have an analog to the mirror-neuron system (MNS) discovered
in nonhuman primates (cf., Keysers and Gazzola 2010). It is rea-
sonable to assume that effective social interaction unfolds by
integrating lower-level stimulus properties within a broader
social context. We hence conclude that the absence of a coher-
ent component-process account of social cognition is currently
hindering forward progress in social neuroscience.
One attempt to move beyond a fragmented view of social
neuroscience would be to propose an overarching framework
within which we can understand each discrepant perspective.
The abundance of neuroimaging data on social processes and
the rapid development of pattern-learning technologies make
it now possible to investigate the neural correlates most consis-
tently involved in different social-affective experiments in a
bottom-up fashion. To this end, we comprehensively summa-
rized previously published quantitative meta-analyses on
social-affective phenomena. This set of available brain-imaging
studies naturally covered both lower sensory-related and high-
er abstract processes as well as the neural correlates underlying
embodied simulation and abstract emulation of social interac-
tion. The data-derived localization of social brain regions
served as functional seeds in subsequent analyses to identify
commonalities and differences in brain connectivity among
each other and with the rest of the brain. Meta-analytic con-
nectivity modeling (MACM) provided a task-dependent func-
tional measure of connectivity between network nodes by
determining the coactivation and codeactivation across thou-
sands of diverse, database-stored neuroimaging studies.
Resting-state fluctuations contributed a task-independent func-
tional measure of connectivity between 2 network nodes by
determining correlation strength between metabolic fluctua-
tions. We submitted these complimentary ways of assessing
functional coupling to network clustering in order to determine
neurobiologically meaningful functional groups in the social
brain. This analysis strategy allowed us to produce a quantita-
tive definition of the social brain that describes task-
overarching properties of the brain systems subserving social
interaction. Henceforth, we use the term “social brain atlas” to
denote the set of brain regions with consistent neural activity
increases during social and affective tasks, without preassum-
ing their implication to be exclusive for or specific to social cog-
nition. The present data-guided characterization of the human
social brain atlas was performed from a methodological per-
spective that avoids preassuming traditional psychological ter-
minology (Barrett 2009; Wager et al. 2015; Bzdok and Schilbach
2016) and from a conceptual perspective of network integration
rather than regional specialization (Sporns 2014; Medaglia et al.
2015; Yuste 2015; Bzdok et al. 2016).
Materials and Methods
Deriving a Quantitative Definition of the Social Brain
Atlas
There is widely recognized uncertainty about what parts of the
brain are topographically most specific for social processes
(Brothers 1990; Behrens et al. 2009; Van Overwalle 2009; Meyer-
Lindenberg and Tost 2012). In a first step, we therefore com-
puted a data-driven atlas of the brain regions consistently
implicated in social-affective processing based on existing
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quantitative knowledge from published coordinate-based
meta-analyses.
The neuroimaging literature was carefully searched for
coordinate-based meta-analyses on a variety of “cognitive domains
related to processing information on human individuals as opposed
to the aspects of the physical world.” We searched the PubMed
database (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) for quantitative
meta-analyses on fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging)
and PET (positron emission tomography) studies based on combi-
nations of the search terms: “social,” “affective,” “emotional,”
“face,” “judgment,” “action observation,” “imitation,” “mirror neu-
ron,” “empathy,” “theory of mind,” “perspective taking,” “fMRI,” and
“PET.” Further studies were identified through review articles and
reference tracing from the retrieved papers. We considered statisti-
cally significant meta-analytic convergence points obtained from
either Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE; Eickhoff et al. 2012),
Kernel Density Estimation (Wager et al. 2007), or Signed Differential
Mapping (Radua and Mataix-Cols 2009). The inclusion criteria com-
prised (1) full brain coverage, (2) the absence of pharmacological
manipulations, and (3) the absence of brain lesions or known men-
tal disorders. Additionally, meta-analytic studies were only con-
sidered if they reported (4) convergence locations of whole-brain
group analyses as coordinates according to the standard reference
space Talairach/Tournoux or MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute).
Exclusion criteria were experiments assessing neural effects in a
priori defined regions of interest. Rather than compiling a
hand-selected list of target psychological tasks, all published
meta-analytic review papers related to any type of social-affective
cognition were eligible for inclusion in the present study. This
approach avoids biased choices as to the debate whether uniquely
social brain regions exist or whether social thought is instantiated
by general-purpose cognitive processes (cf., Mitchell 2009; Van
Overwalle 2011; Bzdok et al. 2012b). The ensuing heterogeneous
set of published meta-analyses covered many psychological tasks
ranging from social-reward-related decision-making, over social
judgments on facial stimuli, to constructing autobiographical
mental scenes. The considered quantitative meta-analyses hence
included affective and nonaffective, more sensory lower-level and
more associative higher-level, environment-driven and scene-
construction-driven, embodiment- and mentalizing-based, as
well as motor-simulation-implemented and motor-unrelated
social-affective processes. In total, an exhaustive literature
search yielded 26 meta-analysis publications with significant
convergence from original 25 339 initial foci from 3972 neuro-
imaging studies in 22 712 participantsQ4 (Table 1).
The significant convergence locations from the collected
quantitative meta-analyses were then condensed into a consen-
sus social brain atlas. To this end, we gathered the locations of
the activation foci expressed in standardized coordinates from
each eligible meta-analysis. We then assigned each significant
activation focus to 1 of our 36 candidate zones based exclusively
on the topographical distribution of the coordinate points
(Fig. 1B). The candidate zones have been defined based on brain
areas generally believed to be relevant in social-affective proces-
sing according to comprehensive qualitative reviews on the
social neuroscience literature (Haxby et al. 2000; Decety and
Jackson 2004; Ochsner 2008; Behrens et al. 2009; Stoodley and
Schmahmann 2009; Van Overwalle et al. 2013). An experienced
neuroanatomist double-checked the assignments of the coordi-
nate points reported in the previous meta-analyses to the candi-
date zones of the present study. The resulting coordinates
constituted the list of 36 locations of interest (Table 2). Please
note that the anatomical labels mentioned in the coordinate-
based meta-analyses did therefore not have any influence on
the present results. Reported foci whose provided anatomical
location did not match any of our 36 candidate zones were dis-
carded. Individually within each of these 36 foci pools, a single
consensus coordinate was derived from the Euclidean distance
across all foci assigned to a same anatomical label. In this way,
a comprehensive social brain atlas with 36 consensus locations
was derived from existing meta-analysis papers (Fig. 1C).
The ensuing consensus locations for regions in the social brain
were used to define seed regions with a full 3D shape. To avoid
partial volume effects, this growing process was guided by previous
neuroanatomical knowledge of local gray-matter densities. Starting
from a seed region composed of a single voxel at the consensus
coordinate point, new voxels were iteratively added at the borders
of the current seed region shape. At each step, the directly neigh-
boring voxels with the highest gray-matter probability according to
the ICBM (International Consortium on Brain Mapping) tissue prob-
ability maps were added to the 3D shape. At any iteration, all seed
voxels were therefore direct neighbors without spatial gaps.
Therefore, instead of building regular spheres, these compact seed
regions were thus successively built until reaching a seed volume
of 200 topographically connected voxels. By ensuring a fixed num-
ber of gray-matter voxels per seed region definition, we improved
the comparability of the MACM and RSFC results by accounting for
possible partial volume artifacts. In doing so, the previous 36 con-
sensus coordinates in the social brain were expanded to 36 3D
volumes in a neuroanatomically-informed fashion.
In summary, the quantitative fusion of existing coordinate-
based meta-analyses allowed us to identify a consensus atlas of
36 core regions involved in social and affective information pro-
cessing across diverse psychological manipulations. This quin-
tessential definition of the social brain topography served as the
basis for all subsequent analysis steps. It is important to appreci-
ate that this set of seeds does “not” represent consistent conver-
gence of neural activity in a given brain region “in general.”
Rather, for each region corresponding to one of the a priori ana-
tomical terms (Table 2), we derived a seed “within” this region
that reflects the location of most consistent activity increase
during social and affective processes. All maps of the social
brain atlas are available for display, download, and reuse at the
data-sharing platform ANIMA (http://anima.fz-juelich.de/).
Workflow
The 36 seed regions from the quantitative social brain atlas pro-
vided the basis for all subsequent analysis steps. First, MACM was
used to determine a whole-brain coactivation map individually for
each seed of the social brain atlas. Connectivity in brain states in
a task setting were quantified as correlative increase and decrease
of neural activity in distant brain regions without conditioning on
any specific experimental paradigms. Second, resting-state func-
tional connectivity (RSFC) was used to delineate a whole-brain
map of correlated fluctuation for each seed of the social brain
atlas. It probed connectivity in task-unconstrained brain states as
linear correlation between time series of BOLD signal fluctuations
in the absence of any experimental context. Hierarchical cluster-
ing automatically delineated functional groups of similar connec-
tivity among the social brain seeds. Third, the functional profile of
every seed was determined by testing for relevant overrepresenta-
tion of both social and nonsocial taxonomic categories in the
BrainMap database, which describe psychological and experimen-
tal properties of each stored neuroimaging study. The combina-
tion of these steps incorporated a data-guided framework for the
comprehensive description of the task-constrained connectivity,
task-unconstrained connectivity, and functional associations of
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the human social brain. It is crucial to appreciate that this study
did not set out by presupposing yes-no assignments of brain loca-
tions to be either “social” or not. Instead, (1) the exact locations
and (2) the degree of functional specificity for social-affective pro-
cessing were both determined as part of the present quantitative
investigations.
Task-Constrained Connectivity: MACM
Delineation of whole-brain coactivation maps for each seed
of the social brain atlas was first performed based on the
BrainMap database (www.brainmap.org; Fox and Lancaster
2002; Laird et al. 2011). The aim of the coactivation analysis
was to perform inference on the spatial convergence of neural
activity across all foci of all BrainMap experiments in which the
seed in question is reported as active. In the first step, we iden-
tified all experiments in the BrainMap database that featured at
least one focus of activation in a particular seed. We con-
strained our analysis to fMRI and PET experiments from con-
ventional mapping (no interventions, no group comparisons) in
healthy participants, which reported results as coordinates in
stereotaxic space. These inclusion criteria yielded ~7500 eligible
Table 1
Meta-analysis Category Studies Subjects Foci Scanner
Bartra et al. (2013) NeuroImage Decision-making; Reward processing;
Valuation system
206 3857 3933 fMRI
Brooks et al. (2012) NeuroImage Emotional faces 12 217 274 fMRI
Bzdok et al. (2011) Brain Structure and
Function
Face judgment; Trustworthiness;
Attractiveness
16 390 268 fMRI
Bzdok et al. (2012) Brain Structure and
Function
Morality; Theory of Mind; Empathy 107 1790 2607 fMRI and PET
Caspers et al. (2010) NeuroImage Action observation; Imitation; Mirror
neurons
87 1289 1933 fMRI and PET
Diekhof et al. (2011) NeuroImage Emotion regulation; cognitive reappraisal 49 818 379 fMRI and PET
Fan et al. (2011) Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews
Empathy; Emotion 40 – 664 fMRI
Fusar-Poli et al. (2009) Neuroscience
Letters
Emotional processing; Face processing;
Lateralization
105 1600 1785 fMRI
Fusar-Poli et al. (2009) Journal of
Psychiatry & Neuroscience
Emotional processing; Face processing 105 1600 1785 fMRI
Kohn et al. (2014) NeuroImage Emotion regulation 23 479 505 fMRI and PET
Kurth et al. (2010) Brain Structure and
Function
Emotion; Empathy 46 657 120 fMRI and PET
Laird et al. (2009) The Journal of
Neuroscience
Default-Mode Network 62 840 1056 –
Lamm et al. (2011) NeuroImage Empathy for pain 32 168 617 fMRI
Liu et al. (2011) Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews
Reward valence 142 – 5214 fMRI
Mar (2011) Annual Review of Psychology Theory of mind; Story comprehension 86 1225 766 fMRI and PET
Mende-Siedlecki et al. (2011) Social
Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience
Face evaluation; Attractiveness;
Trustworthiness
28 586 – fMRI
Molenberghs et al. (2009) Neuroscience
and Biobehavioral Reviews
Imitation; Mirror neurons 20 – – fMRI
Qin et al. (2012) Human Brain Mapping Familiarity 80 1274 – fMRI and PET
Schilbach et al. (2012) PloS one Emotional processing; Social cognition;
Unconstrained cognition
2082 – – fMRI and PET
Sescousse et al. (2013) Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews
Reward processing 87 1452 1181 fMRI and PET
Sevinc and Spreng (2014) PloS One Moral decision-making; Moral emotions
processing
40 772 399 fMRI and PET
Shi et al. (2013) Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience
Implicit emotional face processing 41 830 531 fMRI
Shkurko et al. (2013) Social Cognitive &
Affective Neuroscience
Social categorization; in-group versus
out-group
33 – 314 fMRI
Spreng et al. (2008) Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience
Autobiographical memory; Prospection;
Navigation; Theory of Mind; Default
Mode Network
84 1437 988 fMRI and PET
Stoodley and Schmahmann (2009)
NeuroImage
Emotion; Cerebellum 9 149 20 fMRI and PET
Van Overwalle et al. (2014) NeuroImage Mirroring; Event mentalizing; Person
mentalizing; abstraction
350 1282 – fMRI
Total 3972 22 712 25 339
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experiments at the time of analysis (queried in October 2015).
Note that we considered all eligible BrainMap experiments
because any preselection based on taxonomic categories would
have constituted a strong a priori hypothesis about how brain
networks are organized. However, it remains elusive how well
psychological constructs, such as emotion and cognition, map
on regional brain responses (Mesulam 1998; Poldrack 2006;
Laird et al. 2009a).
These brain-wide coactivation patterns for each seed were
computed by ALE meta-analysis on all BrainMap experiments
associated with a given seed. The key idea behind ALE is to treat
the foci reported in the associated experiments not as single
points, but as centers for 3D Gaussian probability distributions that
reflect the spatial uncertainty associated with neuroimaging
results. Using the latest ALE implementation (Eickhoff et al. 2009,
2012; Turkeltaub et al. 2012), the spatial extent of those Gaussian
probability distributions was based on empirical estimates of
between-participant and between-template variance of neuroim-
aging foci (Eickhoff et al. 2009). For each experiment, the probability
distributions of all reported foci were then combined into a mod-
eled activation (MA) map by the recently introduced “nonadditive”
approach that prevents local summation effects (Turkeltaub et al.
2012). The voxel-wise union across the MA maps of all experi-
ments associated with the current seed region then yielded an ALE
score for each voxel of the brain that describes the coactivation
probability of that particular location with the current seed region.
To establish which brain regions were significantly coacti-
vated with a given seed, ALE scores for the MACM analysis of
this seed were compared against a null-distribution that reflects
a random spatial association between experiments with a fixed
within-experiment distribution of foci (Eickhoff et al. 2009). This
random-effects inference assesses above-chance convergence
across experiments, not clustering of foci within a particular
experiment. The observed ALE scores from the actual meta-
analysis of experiments activating within a particular seed were
then tested against ALE scores obtained under a null-distribution
of random spatial association yielding a P-value based on the
proportion of equal or higher random values (Eickhoff et al.
2012). The resulting nonparametric P-values were transformed
into z-scores and thresholded at a cluster-level corrected thresh-
old of P < 0.05 after applying a cluster-forming threshold of
voxel-level P < 0.001 (Eickhoff et al. 2016). While caution has been
raised against performing cluster-level inference in single fMRI
experiments (Eklund et al. 2016), with false positives more fre-
quently arising in the posteromedial cortex (Eklund et al. 2016),
this significance testing procedure was found beneficial for quan-
titative meta-analysis experiments based on the ALE algorithm
in a recent systematic evaluation (Eickhoff et al. 2016).
Task-Unconstrained Connectivity: RSFCs
For cross-validation across disparate brain states, significant
clusters-wise whole-brain connectivity was also assessed using
resting-state correlations as an independent modality of func-
tional connectivity. RSFC fMRI images were obtained from the
Nathan Kline Institute Rockland–sample, which are available
online as part of the International Neuroimaging Datasharing
Initiative (http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/pro/nki.html). In
total, the processed sample consisted of 132 healthy participants
between 18 and 85 years (mean age: 42.3 ± 18.08 years; 78 male,
54 female) with 260 echo-planar imaging (EPI) images per partici-
pant. Images were acquired on a Siemens TrioTim 3T scanner
using blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast [gradient-
echo EPI pulse sequence, repetition time (TR) = 2.5 s, echo time
Figure 1. Constructing a quantitative social brain atlas. (A) Probabilistic map of social-affective processing in humans derived from significant convergence foci of pre-
viously published neuroimaging meta-analyses (Table 1). (B) Individual locations of meta-analytic convergence foci from the previously published meta-analyses.
They were color-assigned according to the anatomical terms reported in the respective paper. (C) Thirty-six consensus seed regions defining the social brain were
computed by averaging the locations of all significant foci assigned to a same anatomical term (Table 2). These 36 seeds provided the basis for all presented connec-
tivity analyses. Seeds were surface-rendered for display using PySurfer (http://pysurfer.github.io/). All maps of the social brain atlas are available for display, down-
load, and reuse at the data-sharing platform ANIMA (http://anima.fz-juelich.de/).
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(TE) = 30ms, flip angle = 80°, in-plane resolution = 3.0 × 3.0mm,
38 axial slices (3.0mm thickness), covering the entire brain]. The
first 4 scans served as dummy images allowing for magnetic field
saturation and were discarded prior to further processing using
SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The remaining EPI images were
then first corrected for head movement by affine registration
using a two-pass procedure by initially realigning all brain scans
to the first image and subsequently to the mean of the realigned
images (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al. 2011; Hamilton et al. 2011;
Hurlemann et al. 2010). The mean EPI image for each participant
wasQ5 spatially normalized to the MNI single-subject template
(Holmes et al. 1998) using the “unified segmentation” approach
(Ashburner and Friston 2005). The ensuing deformation was then
applied to the individual EPI volumes. Finally, images were
smoothed by a 5-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel to improve signal-
to-noise ratio and account for residual anatomical variations.
The time-series data of each voxel of a given seed were pro-
cessed as follows (Fox et al. 2009; Weissenbacher et al. 2009):
In order to reduce spurious correlations, variance that could
be explained by the following nuisance variables was removed:
(1) The 6 motion parameters derived from the image realign-
ment, (2) the first derivative of the realignment parameters, and
(3) mean gray matter, white matter, and CSF signal per time
point as obtained by averaging across voxels attributed to the
respective tissue class in the SPM 8 segmentation (Reetz et al.
2012). All of these nuisance variables entered the model as first-
and second-order terms (Jakobs et al. 2012). Data were then band-
pass filtered preserving frequencies between 0.01 and 0.08 Hz
since meaningful resting-state correlations will predomi-
nantly be found in these frequencies given that the BOLD-
response acts as a low-pass filter (Biswal et al. 1995; Fox and
Raichle 2007).
To measure task-independent connectivity for each seed of
the social brain atlas, time courses were extracted for all gray-
matter voxels composing a given seed. The overall seed time-
course was then expressed as the first eigenvariate of these
voxels’ time courses. Pearson correlation coefficients between
the time series of the seeds and all other gray-matter voxels in
the brain were computed to quantify its resting-state fluctua-
tion pattern. These voxel-wise correlation coefficients were
Table 2
Macro-anatomical region Seed tag MNI coordinates Micro-anatomical region
x y z
Right inferior frontal gyrus IFG_R 48 24 2 Area 45 (54.5%) and Area 44 (1.5%)
Left hippocampus HC_L −24 −18 −17 CA3 (63%), Subiculum (16.5%), CA2 (12%), and DG (2%)
Right hippocampus HC_R 25 −19 −15 CA3 (38.5%), Subiculum (27%), CA2 (7%), and DG (4%)
Rostral anterior cingulate cortex rACC −3 41 4
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex vmPFC 2 45 −15
Right amygdala AM_R 23 −3 −18 LB (51%), SF (20.5), and CM (8%)
Left amygdala AM_L −21 −4 −18 LB (57%) and CM (30%)
Left nucleus accumbens NAC_L −13 11 −8
Right nucleus accumbens NAC_R 11 10 −7
Left middle temporal gyrus MTG_L −56 −14 −13
Precuneus Prec −1 −59 41
Right temporo-parietal junction TPJ_R 54 −55 20 Area PGa (IPL; 70.5%) and Area PGp (IPL; 10.5%)
Right middle temporal gyrus MTG_R 56 −10 −17
Left temporal pole TP_L −48 8 −36
Right temporal pole TP_R 53 7 −26
Medial frontal pole FP 1 58 10 Area Fp2 (90.9%)
Posterior cingulate cortex PCC −1 −54 23
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex dmPFC −4 53 31
Left temporo-parietal junction TPJ_L −49 −61 27 Area PGa (IPL; 98.5%) and Area PGp (IPL; 0.7%)
Posterior mid-cingulate cortex pMCC
Left middle temporal V5 area MT/V5_L −50 −66 5
Right middle temporal V5 area MT/V5_R 50 −66 6 Area hOc4la (31.5%) and Area hOc5 [MT/V5] (30%)
Left fusiform gyrus FG_L −42 −62 −16 Area FG4 (54.5%) and Area FG2 (45.5%)
Right fusiform gyrus FG_R 43 −57 −19 Area FG4 (71%) and Area FG2 (29%)
Left posterior superior temporal sulcus pSTS_L −56 −39 2
Right posterior superior temporal gyrus pSTS_R 54 −39 0
Left supplementary motor area SMA_L −41 6 45 Rostral PMd
Left anterior insula AI_L −34 19 0
Right supramarginal gyrus SMG_R 54 −30 38 Area PFt (IPL; 100%)
Right cerebellum Cereb_R 28 −70 −30 Lobule VIIa crus I (77.5%) and Lobule VI (22.5%)
Left cerebellum Cereb_L −21 −66 −35 Lobule VI (55.5%) and Lobule VIIa crus I (43%)
Right anterior insula AI_R 38 18 −3
Left supramarginal gyrus SMG_R −41 −41 42 Area PFt (33%), Area hIP2 (23.5%), Area 2 (13%), and
Area hIP3 (11%)
Right supplementary motor area SMA_R 48 6 35 Rostral PMd
Left inferior frontal gyrus IFG_L −45 27 −3
Anterior mid-cingulate cortex aMCC 1 25 30
Cytoarchitectonic assignments were performed based the Jülich atlas using the SPM Anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al. 2005). The relation of our seeds to the PMd was
derived from a recent connectivity-based parcellation study (Genon et al. 2016).
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then transformed into Fisher’s Z-scores and tested for consis-
tency across participants using a random-effects, repeated-
measures analysis of variance. The main effect of connectivity
for individual clusters and contrasts between those were tested
using the standard SPM8 implementations with the appropriate
nonsphericity correction. The results of these random-effects
analyses were cluster-level thresholded at P < 0.05 (cluster-
forming threshold at voxel-level: P < 0.001), analogous to signif-
icance correction for the MACM analysis above.
Hierarchical Clustering Analysis
To identify the coherent functional groups in the social brain
connectivity patterns, we used hierarchical clustering analysis
(Thirion et al. 2014; Eickhoff et al. 2015). Instead of issuing only
one solution based on a hand-selected number of k clusters,
hierarchical clustering algorithms naturally yield a full parti-
tion tree from single-element clusters up to the coarsest two-
cluster solution. This agglomerative bottom-up approach
revealed connectional similarities with increasing coarseness
levels. The implementation was taken from the scipy Python
package using single linkage algorithm and Bray-Curtis dis-
tance metric (http://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/cluster.
hierarchy.html). Each individual seed initially represented a
separate cluster. These were then progressively merged into a
hierarchy by always combining the 2 most similar clusters at
each step. To achieve a synoptic view of the seed-seed relation-
ships (Fig. 3), we computed a consensus hierarchical clustering
averaged across the MACM and RSFC connectivity metrics. On
a methodological note, the hierarchical clustering results did
not alter how the connectivity or functional profiling analyses
of the social brain seeds were performed.
Intranetwork and Extranetwork Connectivity
For the task-constrained and task-unconstrained functional
imaging modalities (i.e., MACM and RSFC), 36 whole-brain con-
nectivity maps have been obtained by computing the statisti-
cally significant coupling patterns based on every seed region.
The seed-specific connectivity maps derived from either MACM
or RSFC modalities were then submitted to 2 complementary
subanalyses.
“Intranetwork” analyses compared seed regions based on
the functional connectivity within the social brain atlas,
whereas “extranetwork” analyses compared seed regions based
on the functional connectivity between the social brain seeds
and the rest of the brain. (1) In the intranetwork analysis, the
whole-brain connectivity maps of each seed were used to
quantify the connectivity strength between the seed regions
themselves. The 36 regions from the social brain atlas were
thus considered as seeds and targets. For correlation across
seeds, the variables hence corresponded to how strongly each
seed was connected to every of the 35 remaining seeds in the
atlas. (2) In the extranetwork analysis, the whole-brain connec-
tivity maps of each seed were used to quantify how strongly
each seed region was connected to the remaining parts of the
brain. Here, the 36 regions from the social brain atlas acted
only as seeds (not as targets). The variables to be correlated
thus corresponded to how strongly each seed was connected to
the gray-matter voxels in the rest of the brain. The ensuing
summary statistic therefore provided a notion of “connectivity
congruency” that quantified how similar seed pairs were func-
tionally coupled within the social brain (intranetwork analysis)
or with the rest of the brain (extranetwork analysis). Note that
we use “functional coupling” as a synonym of “statistical
dependency”. Nevertheless, it has been shown that alternative
explanations can account for changes in functional connectiv-
ity such as common input to a seed and a target regions
(Friston 2011).
Functional Profiling
Finally, the social brain seeds were individually submitted to
an analysis of their functional profiles by forward and reverse
inference. It is important to note that this functional character-
ization constitutes a post hoc procedure that is subsequent to
and independent of the connectivity analyses. The functional
characterization was based on 2 types of BrainMap meta-data
that describe experimental properties of each database-stored
neuroimaging study. “Behavioral domains” code the mental
processes isolated by the statistical contrasts and comprise the
main categories of cognition, action, perception, emotion, and
interoception, as well as their related subcategories. “Paradigm
classes” categorize the specific task employed (see http://
brainmap.org/scribe/ for the complete BrainMap taxonomy).
For the sake of statistical robustness, we excluded all cognitive
categories with less than 50 experiments in the BrainMap data-
base. “Forward inference” on the functional characterization
tested the probability of observing activity in a social brain seed
given previous knowledge of a psychological process. Using for-
ward inference, a seed’s functional profile was determined by
identifying taxonomic labels for which the likelihood of finding
activation in the respective seed was significantly higher than
the a priori chance (across the entire database) of finding acti-
vation in that particular cluster. In contrast, “reverse inference”
tested the likelihood a specific psychological process being
present given previous knowledge of brain activation in a cer-
tain social brain seed. Thus, this second functional profiling of
the seed regions allowed us to infer a seed’s functional profile
by identifying the behavioral domains and paradigm classes
given activation in that particular seed region. In summary, for-
ward inference assessed the likelihood of observing neural
activity given a psychological term across 2 established descrip-
tion systems of mental operations, while reverse inference
assessed the likelihood of engaging a psychological process
given a brain activity pattern based on the same 2 descriptions
systems of mental operations. Reverse inference has however
repeatedly been argued to be challenging to draw in certain
neuroimaging analysis settings (Poldrack 2006; Yarkoni et al.
2011; Wager et al. 2016).
Results
This study attempts a comprehensive characterization of the
“social brain” as it can be experimentally probed and quantita-
tively measured using common brain-imaging techniques. For
36 regions in the social brain, we computed the exact location
of highest topographical consistency for social-affective pro-
cesses from existing meta-analyses (Fig. 1; Tables 1 and 2). This
step was motivated by recent connectivity-based parcellation
studies showing many target regions in the present study to be
decomposable into functionally distinct subregions, such as the
amygdala (Saygin et al. 2011), prefrontal cortex (Sallet et al.
2013), cingulate cortex (Beckmann et al. 2009), or insula (Cauda
et al. 2012). Please note that, among all 36 seed locations,
the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex is probably most
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susceptible to signal dropout (Glover and Law 2001; Deichmann
et al. 2003), which may have disadvantageously influenced our
meta-analytic results on this part of the brain. This is because
the BOLD signal acquisition in the orbitofrontal region is
affected by magnetic field gradients generated by the proximity
of air-tissue interfaces (Deichmann et al. 2002; Wilson et al.
2002). Different methods have been introduced to reduce the
susceptibility to this effect and increase signal recovery (e.g.,
Turner et al. 1990; Merboldt et al. 2001). However, the present
meta-analytic study could not control that the original data-
based studies included in our functional connectivity analyses
accounted for this effect. To elucidate the functional network
stratification within the social brain, the 36 derived seed
regions were used to delineate the whole-brain connectivity
based on task-dependent coactivations (MACM) and task-
unconstrained time-series correlations (RSFC) (Fig. 2). In a suba-
nalysis, the connectivity architecture of the social seeds was
then evaluated with emphasis on the social brain (intranetwork
connectivity) or taking into account the entire brain (extranet-
work connectivity). Finally, all social brain seeds were automat-
ically linked to their quantitative functional engagements
across psychological tasks. The present study is therefore
objectively reproducible and did not itself impose subjective
limitations to any subset of social-affective processes. The
present results, however, bear unavoidable dependence on the
research trends in the neuroimaging community, the technical
limitations of fMRI technology (e.g., signal dropout), and the
restriction to psychological experiments that are feasible
within brain scanners.
Hierarchical Clustering Analysis
The hierarchical clustering of the social brain seeds based on
their functional connectivity profiles from MACM and RSFC
provided evidence for a division of the social brain into 4
principal systems (Fig. 3; for seed abbreviations see Table 2):
(1) A set of “visual-sensory seeds” was composed of the FG,
pSTS, and MT/V5 from the left and right hemispheres. (2) A
set of “limbic” seeds consisted of the AM, HC, and NAC from
both hemispheres, as well as the rACC and vmPFC (but not
medial FP or dmPFC), also yielded a connectionally coherent
assembly. (3) A set of “intermediate-level seeds” was com-
posed of the aMCC and bilateral AI, IFG, SMG, SMA, and
Cereb. (4) A set of “higher-level seeds” was composed of brain
regions that all belonged to the association cortices, includ-
ing dmPFC (but not vmPFC), medial FP, PCC and Prec, as well
as bilateral TPJ, MTG, and TP. While segregation into these 4
main functional systems was most prominent, the consensus
hierarchical clustering (Fig. 3) naturally exposed alternative
finer-grained clustering solutions that successively decom-
pose the 4 main systems into their constituent subsystems.
Note that the chosen nomenclature of visual-sensory/limbic/
intermediate/higher-level clusters only reflects a topographi-
cal approximation to the facilitate reporting of the results,
rather than a subjective judgment on the functional implica-
tions of the cluster seeds (cf., below for functional profiling
analysis).
We performed clustering subanalyses that individually con-
sidered each of 4 different scenarios: (1) task-dependent versus
Figure 2. Task and rest connectivity of the social brain. (A) The circle plots depict the “congruency” among the connectivity patterns of any given pair of seed regions in
the task-dependent (MACM; “left column”) and task-independent (RSFC; “right column”) brain states when taking into account only the social seed regions (intranetwork
analysis; “upper row”) or the entire brain (extranetwork analysis; “lower row”). The color scale of the lines represents the shared connectional architecture from the
lesser (“red”) to the greater degree of topographical overlap (“yellow”). (B) “Similarity” between the whole-brain connectivity maps of each individual seed between both
MACM and RSFC analyses. The seed regions are ranked in increasing order of task-rest correspondence. The order varies accordingly in the intra- and extranetwork sub-
analyses. The seeds exhibit more similar connectivity between seeds of the social brain rather between seeds and the rest of the brain. For abbreviations see Table 1.
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(2) resting-state connectivity, and the connections to (3) the
social brain exclusively (intranetwork analysis) versus (4) the
whole-brain (extranetwork analysis). Comparing the cluster
configurations emerging from MACM and RSFC within the
social brain, the bilateral pSTS and left FG seeds joined the
intermediate-level cluster composed of the IFG, SMG, SMA, and
the Cereb in MACM. Based on RSFC, however, the pSTS, FG, and
MT/V5 seeds remained clearly differentiated from the rest of
the social brain. Additionally, the bilateral NAC and left AM
seeds were more functionally related to this same
intermediate-level cluster in RSFC than with the limbic cluster
that we found in the consensus analysis.
In a series of subanalyses to test the robustness of the
results, we performed 100 split-half procedures of the cluster-
ing approach based on connectivity data. In MACM and in
RSFC, we observed essentially identical clustering solutions to
emerge from the separate data splits. This corroborates the
suitability of the obtained clustering solution across perturba-
tions of the input data.
Relation Between Higher-Level and Lower-Level
Regions
We adopted a biologically grounded notion of neural processing
hierarchy. It emphasizes axon connections of neuron-neuron
chains that relay information between the lowest-level photo-
receptor cells in the retina or auditory hair-cell receptors in the
inner ear, and the highest-level association cortex without any
direct connections to sensory areas (Pandya and Kuypers 1969;
Jones and Powell 1970; Van Essen et al. 1992; Mesulam 1998).
“Lower-level” regions are few synaptic switches away from sen-
sory receptors, whereas what we call “higher-level” regions are
most relaying neurons away from areas that process incoming
information from the external environment.
Regions from the lower-level, “visual-sensory cluster” (Fig. 4)
included the FG, pSTS, and MT/V5. The intranetwork RSFC analy-
sis showed more coherent connectivity among these seeds than
the MACM-based counterpart. The FG and pSTS seeds showed
significant functional connectivity to the SMA and AI across
Figure 3. Functional networks in the social brain. We computed a consensus hierarchical clustering across the 2 functional connectivity analyses measuring task-
constrained coactivations (MACM) and task-free activity fluctuations (RSFC). Seed regions automatically grouping into a same cluster agree in connectivity across the
2 different brain states. Four major clusters of connectionally coherent social brain regions emerged. These were situated in (“from lower-left to upper-right”): (1) lim-
bic, (2) higher-level, (3) visual-sensory, and (4) intermediate subnetworks. For abbreviations see Table 1.
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MACM and RSFC, as well as to the SMG in MACM. Both FG and
pSTS showed functional connectivity to the AM. The MT/V5 seed
featured significant connectivity to SMG across MACM and RSFC,
as well as to SMA in MACM and MTG in RSFC.
In the “limbic cluster” (Fig. 5), the AM seeds exhibited task-
dependent coactivation with the hierarchically higher regions
dmPFC, IFG, and AI. Further, the HC in the left and right hemi-
spheres were connected to a large set of higher-level regions
including the FP, PCC, and TPJ in both MACM and RSFC analy-
ses, as well as to the AI in MACM and to the aMCC in RSFC. The
vmPFC seed showed strong connectivity to most regions of the
higher-level cluster according to MACM and RSFC, including
the FP, dmPFC, PCC, TPJ, and MTG. The NAC seeds yielded con-
nectivity to the vmPFC, AI, and SMA across MACM and RSFC, as
well as to the rACC and aMCC at rest.
The regions from the “intermediate-level cluster” (Fig. 6)
included, among others, the aMCC and bilateral AI. These seeds
yielded significant functional connectivity to bilateral SMG
across MACM and RSFC, while the aMCC showed resting-state
correlations with bilateral dlPFC. The intermediate-level cluster
also included the bilateral IFG, SMA, SMG, and pSTS. While the
bilateral IFG and SMA seeds showed strong connectivity
between each other according to both MACM and RSFC, the left
and right SMA seeds were strongly connected to the FG in both
connectivity modalities. Seeding from the SMG, we found con-
nectivity targets in the limbic cluster across MACM and RSFC,
as well as resting-state correlations with aMCC. Interestingly,
the pSTS in this cluster showed a distributed connectivity pat-
tern with the higher-level IFG and SMA bilaterally in MACM
and RSFC, as well as with the lower-level regions FG and MT/V5
in MACM and the higher-level dmPFC in RSFC and MTG in
MACM.
The regions from the “higher-level cluster” (Fig. 7) included
the dmPFC, FP, PCC, TPJ, MTG, Prec, and TP, which clustered
Figure 4. Connectivity of the visual-sensory subnetwork. (A) The circle plots visualize the “congruency” in the connectivity patterns of each pair of seeds across diverse
experimental tasks (MACM; “left circle”) and fluctuations across time (RSFC; “right circle”). It shows the intranetwork characterization comparing to what extend seeds
are identically connected within the social brain. (B) The task-dependent (“orange”) and task-free (“blue”) connectivity maps of each seed as well as their spatial overlap
(“yellow”) are displayed separately on the left, left-midline, superior, right-midline, and right surface views of a T1-weighted MNI single-subject template rendered using
Mango (multi-image analysis GUI; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). All results are cluster-level corrected for multiple comparisons. For abbreviations see Table 1.
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robustly based on their connectivity patterns in task-structured
(MACM) and unstructured (RSFC) brain states. These higher-
level seeds were more strongly connected among each other
than to any lower- or intermediate-level seeds. Still, we found
functional connectivity between these higher-level seeds and
other intermediate- or lower-level regions. Specifically, the
dmPFC and medial FP seeds were connected to the bilateral IFG
across MACM and RSFC. The PCC seed was also connected to
the IFG in MACM. The left TPJ seed showed connectivity to the
IFG and SMA across MACM and RSFC. Instead, the right TPJ
seed yielded task-dependent connectivity to the AI as well as
resting-state correlations with SMA and IFG. All these seed
regions showed resting-state correlations with the Cereb. The
MTG and TP seeds yielded functional connectivity patterns
with the vmPFC and IFG across MACM and RSFC. The dmPFC
and left TPJ seeds coactivated with the pSTS in MACM. The FP
and PCC seeds were functionally connected to the HC (in
MACM for the FP seed and RSFC for the PCC seed). The TP seed
in the left hemisphere showed task-dependent coactivations
with the pSTS and MT/V5, while the right TP seed yielded func-
tional connectivity to the HC in MACM. Both MTG seeds were
functionally connected to the pSTS across MACM and RSFC, but
Figure 5. Connectivity of the limbic subnetwork. (A) The circle plots visualize the “congruency” in the connectivity patterns of each pair of seeds across diverse experi-
mental tasks (MACM; “left circle”) and fluctuations across time (RSFC; “right circle”). It shows the intranetwork characterization comparing to what extend seeds are
identically connected within the social brain. (B) The task-dependent (“orange”) and task-free (“blue”) connectivity maps of each seed as well as their spatial overlap
(“yellow”) are displayed separately on the left, left-midline, superior, right-midline, and right surface views of a T1-weighted MNI single-subject template rendered using
Mango (multi-image analysis GUI; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). All results are cluster-level corrected for multiple comparisons. For the abbreviations see Table 1.
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Figure 6. Functional connectivity of the intermediate-level subnetwork. (A) The circle plots visualize the “congruency” in the connectivity patterns of each pair of
seeds across diverse experimental tasks (MACM; “left circle”) and fluctuations across time (RSFC; “right circle”). It shows the intranetwork characterization comparing
to what extend seeds are identically connected within the social brain. (B) The task-dependent (“orange”) and task-free (“blue”) connectivity maps of seed as well as
their spatial overlap (“yellow”) are displayed separately on the left, left-midline, superior, right-midline, and right surface views of a T1-weighted MNI single-subject
template rendered using Mango (multi-image analysis GUI; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). All results are cluster-level corrected for multiple comparisons. For abbre-
viations see Table 1.
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Figure 7. Connectivity of the high-level subnetwork. (A) The circle plots visualize the “congruency” in the connectivity patterns of each pair from the most associative
seeds across diverse experimental tasks (MACM; “left circle”) and fluctuations across time (RSFC; “right circle”). It shows the intranetwork characterization comparing
to what extend seeds are identically connected within the social brain. (B) The task-dependent (“orange”) and task-free (“blue”) connectivity maps of seed as well as
their spatial overlap (“yellow”) are displayed separately on the left, left-midline, superior, right-midline, and right surface views of a T1-weighted MNI single-subject
template rendered using Mango (multi-image analysis GUI; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). All results are cluster-level corrected for multiple comparisons. For abbre-
viations see Table 1.
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only the MTG seed in the right hemisphere showed functional
connectivity to the HC across MACM and RSFC.
In summary, we found networked configurations along dif-
ferent levels of the natural processing hierarchy. These connec-
tivity analyses detailed how higher- and intermediate-level
neural processing intertwines with lower-level regions, such as
the AM, FG, and pSTS that preprocess social-affective environ-
mental inputs. These functional relationships between the
coherent brain networks provide quantitative links between
major topics in the social and affective neurosciences.
Lateralization
Hemispheric asymmetries were more often observed in task-
constrained brain states than at rest (Fig. 8). Most lateralization
effects were found in the high-level, limbic, and sensory-visual
clusters and were directed towards the left hemisphere
(Fig. 8A). The higher-level cluster displayed mostly bilateral
connections among each other and to regions outside of the
social brain atlas. However, we found a task-dependent, left-
favored lateralization in some of these seeds. Coactivations
were found between the medial FP seed and the left HC, the
PCC seed and the left MTG, the left TPJ seed and the left pSTS,
as well as the right TPJ and the left AI (Fig. 8B). Seeding from
the FP, dmPFC, PCC, and left TPJ congruently resulted in promi-
nent lateralized connections only to the IFG in the left
hemisphere. Further, the TP and MTG in the temporal lobe fea-
tured prominent left-lateralized connectivity pattern not only
to the left IFG, but the left MTG and right TP seeds were also
connected to the left TPJ in MACM, and the left TP seed yielded
connectivity to left pSTS, HC, and MT/V5 in MACM.
In the visual-sensory and limbic clusters, MACM analysis
also revealed a strong tendency for connections to the left
hemisphere (Fig. 8C). The left AM, HC, and MT/V5 seeds were
significantly connected to the left but not right AI. Moreover,
the right AM and bilateral HC seeds showed coactivation with
the TPJ only in the left hemisphere. The left HC seed also
yielded task-dependent coactivation with the left MTG. Both
left and right FG seeds yielded functional connectivity to left
but not right HC. However, we also found hemispheric asym-
metries lateralized to the right hemisphere between the left
AM seed and the right IFG, as well as between the right AM
seed and the right SMA, both in MACM.
The remaining seeds showed a more bilaterally distributed
connectional architecture. We found that the aMCC and both AI
seeds yielded a particularly strong overlap in functional connec-
tivity between each other during tasks. Lateralization effects in
these hierarchically intermediate set of seeds reduced to a task-
dependent coactivation between the left AI and the left FG, as
well as between the right AI and the right SMA. While the IFG,
SMG, and SMA yielded mostly bilateral connectivity patterns
across MACM and RSFC, we found lateralization differences in
Figure 8. Lateralization effects in the social brain. Depicts most important hemispheric asymmetries in task-constrained brain states (MACM) in axial, sagittal, and
coronal slices. (A) Most regions from the higher-level subnetwork showed a lateralized connectivity pattern with the IFG constrained to the left hemisphere. (B) The
left TPJ seed yielded lateralized coactivation with semantic processing regions such as the IFG in the left hemisphere, whereas the right TPJ seed coactivated with
attention-related structures such as the AI. (C) The AM seed in the left hemisphere showed specific connectivity with the dmPFC, in contrast to the AM seed in the
right hemisphere. All results are cluster-level corrected for multiple comparisons. For abbreviations see Table 1.
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some regions, including task-constrained coactivations in the left
IFG seed with the left pSTS, the right IFG seed with the right
NAC, and the right SMA seed with the left FG. While both pSTS
seeds were functionally connected to the left HC and FG in both
analyses, only the left pSTS seed showed coactivation with MTG
and MT/V5 in MACM.
In summary, a trend for lateralization to the left hemisphere
was apparent for social brain seeds during tasks. These asym-
metries converged to connectivity targets along the surface of
the frontal and temporal lobes in the left hemisphere.
Neural Correlates of a Putative “MNS”
We found significant task-constrained coupling between the
IFG, SMG, SMA, and pSTS seeds. The monkey homologs of
these regions have been repeatedly related to action observa-
tion and imitation in animal studies (Gallese et al. 1996; Fogassi
et al. 1998). As a global observation, networked configurations
of a potential MNS in humans were only present in the task-
constrained brain. The RSFC analysis failed to show a net-
worked functional connectivity between these seeds. Only the
SMG and SMA seeds showed coherent RSFC correlations with
the rest of the social brain. This is similar to our findings for
social brain seeds related to the intermediate cluster and con-
trary to those related to the higher-level cluster.
As an important specific observation, hierarchical clustering
led to a shared cluster of seeds in the social brain that included
the AI and aMCC, together with the potential MNS (mostly IFG,
SMA, SMG, but also pSTS and MT/V5) in humans. We found
many instances of task-dependent coupling of these seed
regions, especially when only taking into account the social brain
seed regions (intranetwork analysis). Additionally, MACM and
RSFC connectivity analyses agreed in clearly segregating this set
of seeds from the regions belonging to the higher-level cluster.
That is, the connectional configurations of the dmPFC, FP,
vmPFC, PCC, and bilateral TPJ did not show strong connections
to seeds in the intermediate-level cluster in MACM or RSFC.
The MNS-related seeds showed a particularly strong connectiv-
ity pattern between the IFG and SMA seeds (see Fig. 6). The RSFC
analysis only revealed weak functional correlations between the
bilateral IFG seeds, as well as between the bilateral SMG and right
SMA. The left IFG seed also showed task-dependent coactivation
with the NAC, while the left SMG and right SMA seeds showed
resting-state correlations with the NAC. In RSFC analyses, the
right IFG and bilateral SMG seeds were connected to the aMCC.
The left IFG and bilateral SMA seeds were also connected at rest
with the bilateral TPJ. While the left SMG, left SMA, and right pSTS
seeds yielded task-dependent coactivation with the bilateral AI,
only the left SMG seed was functionally connected to this struc-
ture in RSFC. Furthermore, the left pSTS seed showed resting-
state correlations with dmPFC, while the right pSTS seed was con-
nected to this same structure in MACM. The left SMA seed yielded
connectivity to PCC only in RSFC. Finally, bilateral SMG and SMA
seeds were all connected to the Cereb in RSFC.
In summary, pronounced overlaps of MACM results were
observed between seed regions in the putative mirror neuron
system as well as in the bilateral AI and aMCC. Additionally,
these connectional configurations were quite different from
social brain connectivity in the higher-level seeds.
Task-Constrained versus Resting-State Connectivity
A general trend for agreement was observed between task-
dependent coactivations and resting-state correlations for our
social brain atlas (Fig. 2B). However, the strength of intranet-
work connectivity patterns varied to a greater extent across the
2 connectivity modalities, being more prominent in task-
constrained coupling as measured by MACM than in task-free
coupling as measured by RSFC.
In the “higher-level cluster,” convergence across the 2 analy-
ses was observed for the FP, dmPFC, PCC, TPJ, TP, and MTG
seeds. However, as mentioned above, the functional connec-
tions between these seeds and the IFG were lateralized to the
left hemisphere in MACM but bilaterally distributed in RSFC.
Furthermore, the FP, dmPFC, PCC, and TPJ seeds showed
resting-state correlations with the Cereb that were not present
in MACM. Moreover, the TP in the left hemisphere yielded sig-
nificant task-dependent coactivations with the lower-level
regions pSTS, MT/V5, and HC.
In the “intermediate-level cluster,” the aMCC seed showed
task-dependent functional connectivity to the MNS-related tar-
get regions SMA and SMG. This seed was additionally con-
nected to the bilateral dlPFC as well as to the NAC and Cereb
only at rest. The bilateral AI seeds were both significantly con-
nected to the PCC in RSFC but not in MACM. Functional connec-
tivity between the left AI seed and the bilateral pSTS and NAC
was found only in MACM. Further, the SMA and SMG seeds also
showed a congruent functional connectivity pattern across
MACM and RSFC results. Task-constrained specific connectivity
patterns were found between the left pSTS seed and the left
MTG and MT/V5, as well as between the right pSTS seed and
the dmPFC, bilateral AI, and left FG and HC. However, resting-
state correlations were found between the bilateral SMA seed
and the bilateral TPJ, as well as between the right IFG and SMA
seeds with the NAC. Moreover, the left SMG seed showed con-
nectivity to the FG only at rest. Again, all the IFG, SMG, SMA,
and pSTS seeds from both hemispheres showed functional con-
nections to the Cereb only in RSFC.
In the “limbic cluster,” especially the AM seeds showed con-
nectivity differences between MACM and RSFC. We found that
both AM seeds were coactivated with the bilateral AI, IFG, and
FG in MACM, while only the left AM seed yielded functional
connectivity to the dmPFC in MACM. In contrast, both left and
right AM seeds were connected to the vmPFC in RSFC. While
the left HC seed was also connected to the vmPFC across
MACM and RSFC, the right HC seed only yielded connectivity to
the vmPFC at rest. Furthermore, we found task-dependent con-
nectivity between the right HC seed and the bilateral NAC, FG,
AI, and left TPJ, as well as resting-state correlations between
the left HC seed and the bilateral TPJ, MTG, and IFG. We also
found functional connectivity between the bilateral FG seeds
and the bilateral AI, SMA, and left HC only in MACM.
In summary, our functional connectivity analyses compre-
hensively characterized the task-rest differentiation of the social
brain. Social brain seeds tended to exhibit a higher number of
specific connections during tasks, rather than at rest, and these
predominantly targeted regions in the left hemisphere.
Functional Profiling
Each social brain seed was separately characterized by quanti-
tative association with 2 comprehensive description systems of
mental operations (Fig. 9 and Supplementary Figs 5–7): the
Behavioral Domains (BD) and Paradigm Classes (PD) from the
BrainMap taxonomy. We measured the likelihood of observing
neural activity in a seed given previous knowledge of a given
cognitive category (i.e., forward inference) as well as the
Computing the Social Brain Connectome Across Systems and States Alcalá-López et al. | 15
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
likelihood of a particular cognitive category given observed
neural activity in a certain region (i.e., reverse inference).
Generally, each seed of the social brain was associated with
several cognitive categories to a relevant extent. Based on BDs
or on PCs, none of the seeds was linked to few or no cognitive
terms. This piece of evidence indicated that “each seed individ-
ually contributes to a diverse and distinct set of cognitive
facets,” even if they act in concert to entertain social cognition.
This observation prompted us to be more cautious about the
results from the reverse inference analysis. We therefore focus
on the results derived from the forward analysis (see
Supplementary Figs 6 and 7 for the reverse inference results).
Specifically, both BDs and PCs agreed in 3 main observations.
First and foremost, we found a similar number of relevant
functional associations with taxonomic terms with and with-
out relation to social-affective processing. In BDs, the dmPFC
for instance showed relevant associations with the social cate-
gories emotion, especially disgust, fear, and sadness, as well as
sexuality but also with the nonsocial categories reasoning,
working memory, orthography, and spatial processing. In PCs,
the left amygdala for instance showed relevant associations
with the social categories facial judgments, action observation,
affective words, and whistling but also the nonsocial categories
finger tapping, olfactory discrimination, pain processing, mem-
ory retrieval, semantic reasoning, and go/no-go attentional pro-
cessing. This trend of “lacking exclusivity for social-cognitive
categories” held for every seed in the social brain atlas. This
provided data-driven evidence against the existence of a brain
system that would be uniquely devoted to social-affective pro-
cessing in humans. Note however that the nature of the pres-
ent study entails a limitation of functional association results
to the level of “entire” seed regions. Recent studies using other
analysis approaches have shown that multivariate patterns
“within” specific regions in the brain can possibly account for
social-specific processes, such as in the temporo-parietal junc-
tion for perceived behavioral relevance of other agents (Carter
et al. 2012), in the anterior insula for affective empathy (Tusche
et al. 2016), or in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex for social
rejection (Woo et al. 2014).
Second, “seeds that belong to the same cluster (i.e., visual-
sensory, limbic, intermediate, and high-level) exhibited more
similar functional associations than seeds from any 2 of these
clusters.” In BDs, the seeds from the high-level cluster for
instance showed the highest likelihood for the social cognition
category (except for the left TPJ and pMCC) comparing to seeds
from the other 3 clusters. Similarly in BDs, the high-level
Figure 9. Functional specialization for behaviors in the social brain. Forward inference was drawn to comprehensively profile each seed according to the “Behavioral
Domain” categories that are part of the BrainMap taxonomy (http://brainmap.org/scribe/). Each cube represents the likelihood of observing activity in a seed given
previous knowledge of a specific cognitive process. The taxonomy is ordered and colored into social (“red”) versus nonsocial (“blue”) Behavioral Domains to facilitate
visual comparison. First, all seeds turned out not to be “functionally specific” for subserving social-affective, as opposed to nonsocial, processes. Second, each region
in our social brain atlas exhibits an “idiosyncratic portfolio” of associations with various psychological tasks. For abbreviations see Table 1.
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cluster showed among the highest likelihood for processing of
musical information (except for the pMCC). It was only
seconded by the left and right pSTS in the limbic cluster. As an
interesting side note, the closest associations with fear were
not only found in the limbic cluster (especially AM, vmPFC, and
rACC) but also in the high-level cluster (especially pMCC, FP,
dmPFC, and right TPJ). These findings provided a cross-
confirmation for the presented clustering solution into 4 clus-
ters based on functional profiles derived from different data
and statistics.
Third, the functional profiling results are consistent with
a left lateralization of language-related processes and a right-
lateralization of attention-related processes. Stronger language
association on the left versus right was observed for: SMG (all lan-
guage categories), MTG (orthography, phonology, semantics, and
speech), IFG (semantics, speech, and phonology), TP (semantics
and orthography), AM (semantics), and NAC (semantics and syn-
tax), TPJ (semantics and syntax), IFG (semantics and speech), SMA
(speech), and MT/V5 (syntax). Stronger association to attention
processes, in turn, was observed for: FG (visuospatial attention,
tone discrimination and attention, action observation, as well as
visual motion and tracking), IFG (classical conditioning, saccades,
as well as pain, vibrotactile and thermal monitoring), MT/V5
(action observation, saccades, tone discrimination, as well as
stoop, go/no-go, oddball and n-back tasks), AI (acupuncture, sac-
cades, oddball tasks, thermal and vibrotactile stimulation), AM
(cue recall and finger tapping, pain and Wisconsin card sortin
tasks), HC (saccades, pain, n-back and covert naming tasks), pSTS
(go/no-go tasks, oddball tasks, action observation), NAC (delay
matching, flanker andWisonsin card sorting tasks), SMA (tone dis-
crimination and visuospatial attention), SMG (acupuncture and
pitch discrimination), TPJ (action observation and visual motion
tasks), TP (paired associate recall and stroop), MTG (oddball and
pain tasks), and Cereb (saccades, cued explicit recognition).
Discussion
Previous research on the neural instantiation of social-affective
information processing has typically tapped on only a small set
of cognitive processes and concentrated interpretation on pre-
selected brain regions. This local function to social cognition
research motivated the present study to undertake a compre-
hensive exploration of all social brain systems. Thirty-six seeds
were determined by deriving the quintessence from published
quantitative meta-analyses on 3 972 social-affective experi-
ments in 22 712 participants. The derived social brain atlas, as a
quantitative summary of how social-affective behavior is com-
monly measured in brain-imaging research, was the basis for
measuring concomitant neural activity changes in the task-
focused mind set (MACM) as well as time-series correlation of
activity fluctuations in the task-free mind set (RSFC). The com-
plementary modalities allowed investigating connectivity pat-
terns within and outside the social brain, without constraining
the present study to a specific theoretical concept, a particular
brain region, or a preselected target network.
Hierarchical clustering across seed connectivity profiles estab-
lished on its most coarse-grained level a segregation into 4 differ-
ent functional systems: (1) “limbic cluster” of seed regions
(vmPFC, rACC, AM, hippocampus, NACC), (2) “visual-sensory
cluster” of processing regions (FG, pSTS, MV/V5), (3) a “cluster of
intermediate-level processing” (AI, aMCC, IFG, SMG, SMA, Cereb,
possibly also pSTS), and (4) “a cluster of higher-level processing”
(FP, dmPFC, PCC, TPJ, TP, MTG, Prec). We observed a tendency of
the seed regions to yield predominant connectivity within either
higher-level or lower-level hierarchical processing levels. In con-
trast, several seeds in the social brain, such as the AI, AM,
vmPFC, pSTS, and TPJ, yielded a transitional connectional profile
bridging advanced associative and lower-level sensory proces-
sing areas. While most seed regions featured connectivity pat-
terns largely symmetrical across cerebral hemispheres, a number
of exceptions with frequent left lateralization were found, includ-
ing the dmPFC, AM, IFG, HC, and pSTS. Thus, the present investi-
gation quantitatively characterizes the connectional architecture
of the brain networks underlying social-cognitive processes with
regard to (1) task-unconstrained versus task-conditioned brain
states, (2) sensory-related versus abstract associative processing,
(3) hemispheric asymmetries, as well as (4) the frequently dis-
cussed functional networks underlying ToM, empathy, and the
MNS, which we will consider in the following.
The Environment-Engaged versus Detached Social
Brain
The constructed social brain atlas was analyzed using 2 different
approaches to functional connectivity that emphasize distinct
aspects of functional brain architecture (Buckner et al. 2013;
Eickhoff et al. 2015). MACM analysis captures the congruency in
coactivation probability across a large quantity of diverse neuro-
imaging experiments, while RSFC analysis is based on fMRI time
series obtained while participants are scanned in the absence of
a structured task set. The large majority of seed regions showed
an almost identical whole-brain connectivity pattern in MACM
and RSFC, including the dmPFC, FG, SMG, MT/V5, and TPJ. This
concurs with previous neuroimaging studies where MACM and
RSFC analyses show widespread topographical agreement
(Cauda et al. 2011; Hardwick et al. 2015). Thus, the currently
increasing evidence for a close task-rest correspondence extends
to the human social brain whose brain network stratifications
were shown to be largely robust in the context of volatility in the
external environmental and throughout cognitive sets (Smith
et al. 2009; Mennes et al. 2013; Bzdok et al. 2016).
However, our analyses also showed notable differences
across both connectivity techniques. Considering connectivity
only within the social brain (i.e., intranetwork analyses), both
AM were congruently coupled with the HC, vmPFC, and NAC
during tasks (MACM), while these coupling patterns among
nodes of the limbic system were absent outside of the task set-
ting (RSFC). More specifically, the AM featured congruent con-
nectivity comparing to the IFG and aMCC of the salience
network at rest but not during tasks in both intranetwork and
extranetwork analyses. Although the present study qualifies as
exploratory in nature, these results provide evidence that the
AM assumes a double-integrator role by functionally binding
limbic system nodes during environmental stimulation and a
general maintenance network in the unconstrained brain state.
This is congruent to previous coordinate-based meta-analyses
using another modality of connectivity: psychophysiological
interactions. These studies support a differential role of the AM
as both an input-processing region and as an integrator of other
important regions for large-scale networks including the pre-
frontal cortex (Smith et al. 2016; Di et al. 2017). The different
levels of task-dependent interaction between the AM and other
regions highlight the importance of this region in distinct brain
mechanisms and, thus, potentially cognitive and affective pro-
cesses. Additionally, the vmPFC, typically involved in stimulus-
value association and decision-making (Kringelbach and Rolls
2004; Gläscher et al. 2012), showed a task-dependent coactiva-
tion with the NAC of the reward circuitry that was not observed
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in the idling social brain. It concurs with the vmPFC’s proposed
role in approach-avoidance choices towards individuals and
objects in the here and now that predict social competences and
social network properties (Lebreton et al. 2009; Powell et al.
2010), whereas the medial FP and the dmPFC are more inti-
mately related to environment-detached, internally-generated
mentation (Laird et al. 2009b; Nicolle et al. 2012; Bzdok et al.
2013; Bado et al. 2014). Finally, as mentioned above, characteris-
tic lateralization patterns, most prominently observed to the left
IFG, were mostly a property of the task-engaged rather than
mind-wandering social brain.
In summary, we detail the previous idea of ongoing social
cognition as a possible neurophysiological baseline (Schilbach
et al. 2008, 2012; Krienen et al. 2010) by identifying a character-
istic task-rest sub-differentiation in social brain systems. DMN-
related regions exhibited the highest and saliency-network-
related regions the lowest coherence across the 2 disparate
brain states. The known antagonistic physiology between the
default mode and saliency networks therefore appears to
extend to social brain function (Fox et al. 2005; Fransson 2005;
Bressler and Menon 2010).
Social Cognition Requires Integration between Sensory
and Associative Processing
It is an ongoing debate to what extent social cognition is pre-
dominantly instantiated by high association cortices (Stone
and Gerrans 2006; Decety and Lamm 2007; Mitchell 2009). We
quantitatively revisited this question by conjoint analysis of
lower- and higher-level social regions. For instance, dedicated
modules were suggested to provide the basis of representing
others’ mental states (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). However, after
more than 20 years of neurological lesion reports (Apperly et al.
2004; Samson et al. 2004), electrophysiological and neuroimag-
ing studies in autism (for a review, see: Pelphrey et al. 2011),
more and more investigators adopt mosaic explanations for
theory of mind (Behrens et al. 2009; Bzdok et al. 2012a). Instead
of exclusive reliance on a specialized monolithic system, theory
of mind and other social capacities might develop ontogeneti-
cally and be maintained by collaboration of lower-level social-
affective systems These include face perception and joint
attention, as well as general-purpose systems, such as working
memory, executive function, and scene construction (Decety
and Grezes 2006; Stone and Gerrans 2006; Schurz et al. 2014). In
other words, the lower-level regions perform preprocessing of
sensory input needed to inform, elaborate, and update internal
models of social phenomena and interaction scenarios, while
the back projection from higher-level regions exert control over
these lower-level processes controlled by pertinence of predic-
tions of actual inputs (Corbetta et al. 2008; Abu-Akel and
Shamay-Tsoory 2011; Song et al. 2011; Friston et al. 2013). This
emerging contention is invigorated by the present functional
profiling findings that unveiled a characteristic fingerprint of
psychological task engagements for every single seed. Put dif-
ferently, there is not one characteristic task for each seed.
A mosaic view of the social brain was also confirmed by a num-
ber of further findings.
We obtained a “high-level subnetwork” of connectionally
coherent seed regions known to be associated with theory of
mind (i.e., bilateral TPJ, PCC, Prec, FP, MTG, TP, and dmPFC).
They featured stronger coupling among each other than with
any other seed region in the social brain during tasks (MACM)
and at rest (RSFC). This set of brain regions is typically referred
to as the “default mode” network (DMN) in the neuroimaging
literature (Buckner et al. 2008). Please note that there is contro-
versy whether the Prec should be considered a core part of the
DMN (Utevsky et al. 2014) or does not belong to the “DMN
proper” (Margulies et al. 2009; Bzdok et al. 2015). Iacoboni et al.
(2004) specifically explored the relationship between this net-
work and social-cognitive processes in an fMRI study. These
authors found that participants watching social interactions in
movie clips showed increased BOLD signal in the DMN com-
pared with when they watched movie clips with single indivi-
duals performing everyday-life actions or during rest. This is
congruent with another fMRI experiment showing that the
neural activity in the posterior parietal region decreases when
participants are required to retrieve self-knowledge relative to
rest, but increases during social-knowledge retrieval compared
with rest (Pfeifer et al. 2007). In a similar fashion, Spunt and
colleagues (2015) have very recently suggested that the link
between the DMN and social-cognitive mentalizing ability is
not only coincidental in terms of the neural infrastructure. The
authors tested in an fMRI study whether resting-state neural
activity within the DMN regions prepares us to infer other indi-
viduals’ mental states. They found that increased spontaneous
activity within the dmPFC preceding a social judgment task
was related to shorter response times (Spunt et al. 2015).
Moreover, individuals showing greater dmPFC activation at rest
scored higher in a self-report measure of social skills. Together,
these findings have been interpreted as a social priming effect
in the resting-state activity of the DMN.
Another social brain cluster automatically grouped an
“intermediate-level subnetwork” (AI, aMCC, IFG, SMG, SMA,
Cereb, possibly also pSTS). The AI was long believed to be spe-
cific for disgust processing (Adolphs 2002), later consistently
identified in vicarious emotion processing (i.e., empathy) and
pain in social neuroscience (Lamm and Singer 2010; Fan et al.
2011; Bzdok et al. 2012b), and is today understood as an inte-
grating link between large-scale brain systems (Kurth et al.
2010; Kelly et al. 2012). Confirming the latter, our connectivity
results linked the AI to the bilateral IFG, precentral gyrus and
SMA/aMCC in the frontal lobe, bilateral TPJ and SMG in the
parietal lobe, FG in the posterior temporal lobe, and the Cereb
in both MACM and RSFC analyses. The present results thus
supplement the conceptualization of the AI (Seeley et al. 2007;
Craig 2009; Menon and Uddin 2010) as salience and relevance
detectors, which can underlie not only social but also nonsocial
behaviors (cf., Ousdal et al. 2008; Kurth et al. 2010).
A similarly heterogeneous functional connectivity pattern
bridging hierarchical processing levels was found for the AM in
the limbic cluster. It showed connectivity to the intermediate
seed clusters (aMCC and IFG) but also lower-level regions (thal-
amus, subthalamus, HC, and parahippocampal cortex in both
MACM and RSFC) and higher-level regions (dlPFC, vmPFC, FP,
and MTG). Furthermore, our FG seed in the visual-sensory clus-
ter corresponds to the “fusiform face area” involved in socially-
relevant input processing (Puce et al. 1995; Kanwisher et al.
1997; Haxby et al. 1999). Its connectivity results range from AM,
visual cortex, FG (MACM and RSFC analyses) and right pSTS
(MACM) to the higher-level regions AI, SMG, and MTG (MACM).
This concurs with the described model of FG connectivity to an
extrastriate core system for face perception and a distributed,
extended system for gaze perception and spatial attention
(Mishkin et al. 1983; Harries and Perrett 1991; Colby and
Goldberg 1999; Hoffman and Haxby 2000). Appraisal and bind-
ing of environmental input carrying social information is mod-
ulated by the NAC, a major node for motivation and reward
(Schultz 2004; Knutson and Cooper 2005). In line with a
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previous study on NAC connectivity (Cauda et al. 2011), our
results showed connectivity patterns from the NAC seeds to AI,
AM, HC, and dorsal thalamus in both MACM and RSFC analy-
ses. The functional connectivity between the NAC and the
most ventral mPFC seed concurs with their well-described
direct anatomical connections (Haber and McFarland 1999). In
contrast to AI, AM, and NAC, the cerebellum is typically
neglected in studies on social cognition (but see: Stoodley and
Schmahmann 2009; Van Overwalle et al. 2013). The present
seeds in the cerebellar lobules VII and VI exhibited motor-
related connections to the SMA, bilateral dorsal striatum, and
precentral gyrus in MACM and RSFC emphasize a possible role
in motor-mediated representation for embodied simulation
facets in social-affective processing. Yet, recent connectivity
studies support functional connectivity of the cerebellum with
the ToM network (Van Overwalle and Mariën 2016).
In summary, the social brain spans across different neural
processing levels when divided into 4 broad functional compo-
nents. The high-level subnetwork, previously known for cohe-
sive response such as in theory-of-mind tasks, showed a
number of links to brain parts outside of the association cortex
that are generally implicated in attention, executive, memory,
and spatial processes. The intermediate-level subnetwork,
known for cohesive response such as in empathy and pain
tasks, featured more links with brain parts dedicated to prepro-
cessed sensory input and motor response preparation. Yet, it
was itself superseded by the limbic and visual-sensory subnet-
works, known as collectively responsive such as to facial and
other biologically relevant cues, with the most immediate rela-
tion to perception-action cycles in social cognition.
Functional Lateralization in the Social Brain
Neuroscientific investigations on hemispheric specialization
have broadly converged to the left cerebral hemisphere as dom-
inant for language (Broca 1865; Wernicke 1874; Lichtheim 1885)
and the right hemisphere as dominant for attention functions
(Gazzaniga et al. 1965; Sperry 1982; Stephan et al. 2003). This
contention is largely confirmed by the present functional profil-
ings results. The present lateralization findings in connectivity
will therefore be interpreted with emphasis on functional
asymmetry between semantics versus attention (Stephan et al.
2007; Seghier 2013). In general, we found more inter-
hemispheric differences in social-affective network architec-
tures based on task-constrained functional connectivity than in
the absence of experimental constraints.
Regarding the high-level cluster in the social brain, most
regions showed a left-favored lateralization pattern of func-
tional connectivity. For instance, MACM revealed FP, dmPFC,
PCC, and left TPJ to be connected to left (but not right) IFG,
which is topographically related to Broca’s region (Amunts
et al. 2010). The FP seed showed functional connectivity to the
left HC, while PCC yielded connectivity to the left MTG, related
to elaboration of preprocessed auditory and semantic informa-
tion (Binder et al. 2009). While some previous studies on ToM-
related regions have reported bilateral activity patterns (Mar
2011; Schilbach et al. 2012), several social cognition studies
argued for a contribution of the left TPJ to processing semantic
aspects (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Hensel et al. 2015; Price
et al. 2015) and the right TPJ to processing lower-level atten-
tional aspects (Decety and Lamm 2007; Mitchell 2008; Scholz
et al. 2009; Santiesteban et al. 2012) of task performance. It is
conceivable, however, that higher-level, self-related cognitive
processes, such as prospection, delay discounting or self-others
distinction, partially rely on world knowledge stored as seman-
tic concepts, characterized by consistent left lateralization
(Binder et al. 1999; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; Binder et al.
2009; Carruthers 2009; Gotts et al. 2013). The left TPJ seed even
showed widely distributed connectivity to targets across the
lateral temporal lobe from pSTS to TP in the task-unconstrained
brain state. In contrast, the right TPJ seed was connected to AI
and lateral SMA indicative of putative links to attention and
motor control. Consequently, the ToM-related default-mode
regions generally showed a close relation to left-sided semantic
processing networks during tasks and at rest.
Analogous to the high-level subnetwork in the social brain,
the intermediate-level subnetwork showed left-skewed connec-
tivity profiles, again more in MACM than RSFC. Lateralization
effects of the bilateral pSTS, left SMG, and right SMA converged
to the left FG during tasks. However, the overall left lateraliza-
tion of FG-seeded coactivations stands in contrasts with the
widespread idea that the right fusiform gyrus is more specifi-
cally tuned to face perception in humans (De Renzi 1986;
Kanwisher et al. 1997; Wada and Yamamoto 2001; Barton 2008).
Interestingly, further left-lateralized coactivations were found
from left pSTS with left MTG and left MT/V5 and from right
pSTS with left HC. The established role of the pSTS in multi-
modal sensory integration during both stimulation with and
without speech (Buchsbaum et al. 2001; Leech et al. 2009)
appears to be implemented in a set of heterogeneous nodes
with pronounced left participation. The neural response of the
so-called saliency network, closely related to empathic perfor-
mance, has mainly been reported to be bilaterally distributed
(Fan et al. 2011; Lamm et al. 2011; Bzdok et al. 2012b). This is
confirmed by our analyses that showed bilateral connectivity
patterns for the AI and aMCC across task and rest. The excep-
tion of task-dependent coactivation between the right (not left)
TPJ seed and the AI concurs with the general impression that
the salience network subserves empathic processing by prefer-
ential relation to attention, consciousness awareness, and
detection of self-relevant social cues (Craig 2002; Luo et al.
2014), in contrast to the left-lateralized DMN subserving ToM
processing.
Switching from more associative regions to the visual and
limbic subnetworks of the social brain, the AM seeds yielded a
particularly heterogeneous and distributed lateralization pat-
terns. Besides many bilateral connections, the AM coactivated
during tasks with higher-level regions such as FP, dmPFC, IFG,
and AI. More important, the FP connected specifically to the left
AM, while the vmPFC equally connected to both AM across
MACM and RSFC. Therefore, the left AM seems to be more spe-
cialized in information modulation in concert with high associ-
ation cortices. While meta-analysis evidenced the left AM to
activate more often than its right counterpart during emotion-
perception tasks (Sergerie et al. 2008), this physiological effect
might be explained by faster habituation in the right AM
(Wright et al. 2001). Generally, different authors voiced the sus-
picion that the right AM is relatively specialized in rapid,
dynamic emotional stimuli detection, whereas the left AM is
more dedicated to sustained evaluation of environmental sti-
muli (Morris et al. 1998; Markowitsch 1999; Phillips et al. 2001;
Wright et al. 2001). For instance, left AM has been specifically
associated with particularly elaborate social cognition pro-
cesses such as moral cognition (Bzdok et al. 2012b), emotion
regulation (Delgado et al. 2008; Diekhof et al. 2011; Kohn et al.
2014), story-based theory of mind (Mar 2011), in-group versus
out-group social categorization (Shkurko 2013), and uncon-
strained cognition (Schilbach et al. 2012). Conversely, exposure
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to emotional faces for less than 100ms showed right lateralized
AM activity (Morris et al. 1998; Costafreda et al. 2008).
The left lateralization of the AM seed is partly mirrored by
the neighboring HC. Both HC seeds were connected to left TPJ,
and the left HC was also connected to left MTG in MACM.
Similar to the amygdalar connectivity pattern, the left HC
yielded connectivity to the vmPFC extending to FP in both
MACM and RSFC, while right HC only showed connectivity to
vmPFC in RSFC. This concurs with previous meta-analytic
reports that implicated the left HC relatively more in various
higher-level functions, including autobiographical memory,
prospection, navigation, and theory of mind (Spreng et al.
2009). Similarly, both FG seeds yielded functional connectivity
to left HC. Face perception has been described as highly latera-
lized to the right hemisphere based on neurological lesion
patients (De Renzi 1986; Wada and Yamamoto 2001; Barton
2008). However, since its specific role in face processing was
proposed (Kanwisher et al. 1997), there has been an active dis-
cussion on its functional specialization. Some authors have
pointed out that complex, multi-part visual stimuli such as
chess game-distributions (Bilalić et al. 2011) can also elicit
greater activation in FG in experts compared with novices. In a
recent study, Ma and Han (2012) found a left-favored activation
in FG for physical recognition of one’s own face, while right FG
was more sensitive to self-identity recognition. Together, these
left-favored connectivity patterns shown by lower-level
regions, including AM, HC, and FG, might reflect a global ten-
dency for social-affective input processing regions to be latera-
lized to the left hemisphere as a possible consequence of
unavoidable semantic process recruitment in experimental
neuroimaging paradigms.
In summary, lateralization concepts from the animal and
human amgdala proposed that “rapid automatic detection” is
more related to the right hemisphere and “detailed evaluative
elaboration” is more related to the left hemisphere. Our find-
ings suggest that this functional lateralization account of
amygdalar responses extends to other parts of the social brain.
A “MNS” in the Social Brain?
Mirror neurons are defined by identical spiking activity during
passive observation and active execution of specific motor
movements (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Gallese et al. 1996; Fogassi
et al. 2005). They have initially been described in monkeys in
the frontal area F5 and the parietal area PF/PFG (Gallese et al.
1996; Fogassi et al. 1998). In humans, the precise nature of the
MNS has remained a topic of debate (Keysers and Gazzola
2010). Recently, existence of a human MNS was directly indi-
cated by invasive single-cell recordings during neurosurgery
(Mukamel et al. 2010) and located to the inferior frontal gyrus,
posterior superior temporal sulcus, ventral premotor, and
somatosensory parietal cortices by neuroimaging meta-
analysis (Van Overwalle and Baetens 2009; Caspers et al. 2010).
Action simulation in an observer’s MNS was often proposed to
enable inference of others’ mental states from their nonverbal
behavior (e.g., Grezes et al. 2004; Vogeley and Bente 2010). This
is extended by the present results to coherent network connec-
tivity during various psychological tasks that is much scarcer
during rest. The bilateral SMG, IFG, SMA, and pSTS seeds were
connected to the medial and lateral SMA, while left SMA and
left pSTS seeds were functionally connected to the left IFG. The
strong functional coupling between alleged MNS nodes accord-
ing to MACM but much less RSFC is contrasted with the robust
connectivity among DMN seeds in task and rest. Consequently,
environmental cues of other individuals’ actions might indeed
flow from audiovisual integration in the pSTS to the SMG. From
the SMG the information would be forwarded to the IFG for
planned action execution (i.e., imitation) informed by simu-
lated motor representation of the observed action to reduce
error in predicting environmental events (Iacoboni et al. 1999;
Keysers and Perrett 2004; Kilner et al. 2007). Note however that
this account of mental-state inference based on action under-
standing has been subject to a number of critics (Saxe 2005;
Hickok 2009; Hickok and Hauser 2010).
Further, the functional connections between these MNS-
related (i.e., bilateral IFG, SMA and SMG) and empathy-related
(i.e., aMCC and bilateral AI) seed regions were prominent up to
the point of forming the shared intermediate-level cluster in
our hierarchical clustering analysis. This result entices to spec-
ulate about an intimate functional relation between brain
regions related to action observation and execution and those
related to vicarious appraisal of someone else’s emotional
states (Carr et al. 2003). It is in line with the previous argument
(Gallese 2001) that action observation and execution may be
crucially important for brain systems that instantiate empathy
processes. As an important conclusion, our results discourage
authors who have suggested that the cognitive mechanisms of
abstract emulation in theory of mind might be a core proces-
sing facet underlying simulation and embodiment processes
(Keysers and Gazzola 2007; Uddin et al. 2007), especially during
video watching of motor actions (Iacoboni et al. 2005) and emo-
tional judgments on faces (Schulte-Rüther et al. 2007). This is
because no relevant functional connectivity was observed
between the MNS-related IFG or SMG seed regions and the
ToM-related medial FP, dmPFC, PCC, TP, MTG, and TPJ. More
generally, our results do not exclude the possibility that the
MNS seeds exhibit general-purpose physiological properties by
conjoint connections to sensory and motor systems. Even if our
seed regions topographically coincide with core nodes of a
human MNS, the amount of neurons showing mirror-like firing
properties have been reported to account for only 10% in total
(Rizzolatti et al. 1988; Gur et al. 2002).
In summary, the idea of a MNS in humans receives support
from the coherent network coupling observed in the present
connectivity investigations that is typical in connectivity
strength for other well-defined brain networks. More impor-
tant, we propose a reconciliation of the debated primacy of
mentalizing versus motor simulation in social cognition by
showing that the putative human MNS was stronger connected
to the canonical network underlying “embodied simulation”
(e.g., empathy) in stark contrast to that of “abstract emulation”
of social events (e.g., theory of mind). This insight underlines
the advantage of a systems-neuroscience approach to the
neurobiological implementation of social cognition.
Conclusion
Human social behavior results from neural processes in the
brain. Yet, there are few neuroscientific studies that attempt to
explore the neurobiological implementation of social behavior
from a systems neuroscience perspective. The present study
extracted 36 brain regions that have been topographically
defined based on relatively highest involvement for social pro-
cesses and systematized their physiological relationships in
connectivity analyses. Using a toolbox of data-driven methods,
we achieved far-reaching conclusions about the functional rela-
tionships between social brain systems as they are routinely
quantified by means of brain-imaging experiments. Most
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important, we provided quantitative evidence that “social cog-
nition is realized by neither a single nor a uniquely social
(1) region, (2) network, or (3) hierarchical processing level.” As
another important conclusion, seed regions consistently asso-
ciated with empathy and MNSs gathered in a same functional
group and clearly segregated from the theory-of-mind-associated
default-mode system. This makes the case for combining abun-
dant neuroimaging resources and machine-learning statistics to
design a nomenclature of social cognition directly derived from
brain recordings. Trans-disciplinary understanding of social
behavior would benefit tremendously from a vocabulary
that originates from neurobiological reality rather than human
invention.
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